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INTRODUCTION
On an unseasonably cold evening in southern Texas, Leslie Chew
had trouble sleeping in the car that he called home.1 After finally
deciding that he needed something to keep warm, Mr. Chew entered
a store with no money and a bad plan. Shortly after, Mr. Chew was
arrested for attempting to steal four thirty-dollar blankets.2 Later that
night, a judge set bail at $3500 for Mr. Chew.3 One hundred eightyfive nights later, Mr. Chew was still incarcerated.4
Mr. Chew did not spend six months in jail because he was found
guilty of petit larceny. Instead, Mr. Chew was confined to a cell
because he could not afford to pay either a $3500 cash deposit to the
court or a nonrefundable $350 fee to a bail bondsman.5 As a result,

1. Laura Sullivan, Bail Burden Keeps U.S. Jails Stuffed With Inmates, NPR
(Jan. 21, 2010, 2:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2010/01/21/122725771/Bail-BurdenKeeps-U-S-Jails-Stuffed-With-Inmates.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
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Mr. Chew remained in Lubbock County Jail until he ultimately
received and accepted a plea from the prosecution.6
Similarly, Carol Brown was recently arrested in Brooklyn when a
police officer claimed that he saw her drop a crack pipe.7 When bail
was set at $1000, Ms. Brown realized it would be impossible for her to
come up with the money.8 Although the case was eventually
dismissed after a lab test revealed that there was no drug residue on
the pipe, Ms. Brown had already spent twelve days incarcerated, eight
of which were on Rikers Island.9
Meanwhile, a wealthy attorney in Seattle accused of raping several
massage therapists was able to preserve his liberty after posting the
requisite one-million-dollar bail.10 Even the much-maligned George
Zimmerman was not detained before being tried for allegedly
murdering Trayvon Martin because he was released from custody on
$150,000 bail.11
Bail is a distinctive component of the United States’ legal system in
that it provides wealthy individuals with the opportunity to avoid
pretrial detention, while making it more likely that indigent
defendants will remain incarcerated before either an admission or a
finding of guilt.12 Even if bail is set at an amount that most people
would view as insignificant, it could still be prohibitive for an indigent
defendant. A Human Rights Watch study found that in 2008, eightyseven percent of New York City defendants were unable to post bail
when it was set for merely $1000 or less.13 These charges were all
non-felony offenses and nearly three quarters of them were for minor
transgressions such as trespassing, shoplifting, theft of services

6. Chew v. State, No. 07-06-0210-CR, 2006 WL 2080625, at *1 (Tex. App. July
27, 2006).
7. Russ Buettner, Top Judge Says Bail in New York Isn’t Safe or Fair, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2013, at A1.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Jennifer Sullivan, Seattle Lawyer Facing Rape Charges Free on Bail, SEATTLE
TIMES: THE TODAY FILE (Nov. 1, 2012, 5:48 AM), http://blogs.seattletimes.com/
today/2012/11/seattle-lawyer-facing-rape-charges-free-on-bail.
11. Matt Flegenheimer, George Zimmerman Released After Posting Bail, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/24/us/george-zimmermanreleased-after-posting-bail-in-trayvon-martin-case.html.
12. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 1.
13. JAMIE FELLNER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE PRICE OF FREEDOM: BAIL AND
PRETRIAL DETENTION OF LOW INCOME NONFELONY DEFENDANTS IN NEW YORK
CITY 2 (2010), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1210
webwcover_0.pdf.
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(turnstile jumping), or possession of marijuana.14 To make matters
worse, the accused misdemeanants spent an average of sixteen days in
confinement.15
The vulnerability of indigent defendants is hardly a new
phenomenon. In fact, when Alexis de Tocqueville visited America in
the mid-nineteenth century he noticed that the system of bail was
disproportionately detrimental to the poor and inherently aristocratic.
It is evident that such a [system of bail] is hostile to the poor, and
favorable only to the rich. The poor man has not always a security to
produce, even in a civil case; and if he is obliged to wait for justice in
prison, he is speedily reduced to distress. The wealthy person, on
the contrary, always escapes imprisonment in civil cases; nay, more,
if he has committed a crime, he may readily elude the punishment
by breaking his bail. Thus all the penalties of the law are, for him,
reducible to fines. Nothing can [be] more aristocratic than this
system of legislation.16

Since de Tocqueville first observed that the United States’ bail
system unfairly discriminates against the poor, pretrial detention has
only become more common.17 Today, sixty-two percent of the
country’s incarcerated population is comprised of individuals waiting
to be tried.18 Being detained pretrial deprives the defendant of the
most crucial stage of a criminal case and exacerbates the chances of
the accused being acquitted.19 Furthermore, defendants who are
detained pretrial typically receive harsher sentences than those who
are either released on their own recognizance or able to post bail.20
In an effort to promote judicial parity for indigent defendants, The
Bronx Defenders, a non-profit organization that provides legal

14. Id. at 24.
15. Id. at 71.
16. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 49–50 (Henry Reeve
trans., Barnes & Nobel World Digital Library 2000) (1835).
17. See generally THOMAS H. COHEN & BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, PRETRIAL RELEASE OF FELONY DEFENDANTS IN STATE COURTS (2007),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/prfdsc.pdf; Buettner, supra note
7.
18. Aimee Mayer, For the Poor, Bail Often Means Jail, HUMAN RIGHTS BRIEF
(Mar. 11, 2011), http://hrbrief.org/2011/03/for-the-poor-bail-often-means-jail.
19. See Andrea Clisura, None of Their Business: The Need for Another
Alternative to New York’s Bail Bond Business, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 307, 316 (2010). The
Supreme Court deemed the pretrial stage the “most critical period” of the
proceeding because that is when defendants meet with counsel and develop a defense
strategy. Id. (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 57 (1932)).
20. See id.
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representation to impoverished individuals who are charged with
crimes in Bronx County,21 solicited donations to create the Bronx
Freedom Fund (Freedom Fund).22 The Freedom Fund was a nonprofit corporation that was designed to preserve the liberties of the
accused by using charitable donations to post bail for certain Bronx
Defenders clients.23
Roughly 130 Bronx Defenders clients were bailed out by the
Freedom Fund during its eighteen months of operation.24 Although
these defendants returned to court at a high rate,25 the Fund was shut
down in 2009.26 In People v. Miranda, the Bronx Supreme Court
rejected bail paid by the Freedom Fund because the Fund
contravened public policy by serving as both a bail bond business and
an insurance business without a valid license.27 Because the Fund was
neither registered as a charitable group nor licensed by the state to
operate as a “bail bond business” pursuant to New York insurance
law, the court terminated the practices of the “uninsured bail bond
business.”28 In addition, the Court alluded to the possibility of ethical
violations by the Bronx Defenders attorneys for their involvement
with the Fund, but left the ethical questions unresolved.29
In 2012, New York passed An Act to Amend the Insurance Law, in
Relation to Charitable Bail Organizations (The Charitable Bail
Bonds Bill or Bill), which exempts charitable and non-profit
organizations, like the Bronx Freedom Fund, from the licensing
requirement that People v. Miranda required.30 In signing the
legislation, which came into effect in October 2012, Governor Cuomo
deemed it “unacceptable for defendants to have to spend time in jail

21. Holistic Defense, Defined, BRONX DEFENDERS, http://www.bronxdefenders.
org/our-work/holistic-defense (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
22. See generally People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op.
5160(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
23. See discussion infra Part I.D.
24. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560, at *8.
25. Of the 130 individuals that the Bronx Freedom Fund bailed out from 2007 to
2009, ninety-five percent of the defendants made their court date. Jamila Pringle, Bail
Fund Aims to Free Poor Defendants, BROOKLYN BUREAU (Aug. 13, 2012),
http://www.bkbureau.org/2012/08/13/bail-fund-aims-to-free-poor-defendants.
26. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560, at *15; see also Joel Stashenko, Lippman
Lauds Bronx Group’s Nonprofit Approach to Bail Defenders, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11,
2013, at 1, 7.
27. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560, at *10.
28. See Stashenko, supra note 26, at 1, 7.
29. See Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560, at *18; Stashenko, supra note 26.
30. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6805 (McKinney 2009).
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for low-level crimes they may have not committed simply because
they are unable to meet the bail requirement.”31
While the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill is certainly a valiant attempt
to promote equity for indigent defendants who are vulnerable to
pretrial incarceration,32 it remains to be seen whether the Bill will
accomplish anything. It is plausible that the Bill will be rendered less
effective than anticipated if an attorney’s involvement with the
charitable organization is deemed to be unethical pursuant to New
York’s Rules of Professional Conduct.
Although non-profit
organizations that are unaffiliated with legal services organizations
can post bail for indigent individuals without worrying about ethical
constraints, it is unclear whether attorneys, like those at the Bronx
Defenders, can abide by standards of ethics while also creating or
working with a charitable organization to post bail for their clients.
Part I of this Note addresses the plight of indigent criminal
defendants, attorneys’ efforts to reduce their vulnerability, and the
Charitable Bail Bonds Bill and its effort to promote alternatives to
for-profit bail bondsmen. Part II enumerates the ethical questions
that are likely to arise once attorneys at legal services organizations,
like those at the Bronx Defenders, begin working with charitable
corporations who post bail for the attorney’s clients. Part III seeks to
resolve the ethical questions that are still left unanswered in the wake
of People v. Miranda and the ratification of the Charitable Bail Bonds
Bill.
I. BAIL, ITS TENDENCY TO PROMOTE AN INFERENCE OF GUILT
FOR I NDIGENT M ISDEMEANANTS, AND A LTERNATIVES TO F ORPROFIT BAIL BONDSMEN
A. Bail and Its Impact on Indigent Defendants
Bail is not meant to serve as a punishment to the criminal
defendant.33 In fact, the purpose of bail is not even to insure against
future criminal conduct.34 Instead, bail is a procedural mechanism
that seeks to serve the dual purpose of promoting law enforcement by

31. Press Release, Governor’s Press Office, Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to
Help Low-Income Defendants Meet Bail Requirements (July 18, 2012),
http://www.governor.ny.gov/press/07182012-Help-Low-Income-Defendants-MeetBail.
32. Id.
33. See Pringle, supra note 25.
34. See United States v. D’Argento, 227 F. Supp. 596, 602 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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encouraging defendants to return to court, while simultaneously
upholding the presumption of innocence that is a hallmark of the
American legal system.35 Because there has been no finding of guilt
at the time bail is issued, it cannot be used as an instrument to punish
the accused, but is instead “intended as a catalyst to aid the
appearance of the defendant when wanted.”36
Although the purpose of bail is not to punish the accused, it is
more punitive for certain individuals. For indigent defendants, the
issuance of bail poses a unique set of challenges.37 First, indigent
defendants are likely unable to post bail even when it is set
exceptionally low. In 2010, for example, forty percent of Brooklyn’s
criminal defendants who had bail set at $500 or less were unable to
come up with the money.38 These defendants, who were all accused
of minor crimes such as theft or trespassing, were incarcerated before
any guilty verdict.39 This time in jail not only impedes the defendant’s
opportunity to meet with counsel and construct a defense, but it also
prevents the accused from going to work, attending school, or
receiving any physical or mental therapy to which they may be
accustomed.40
Because of the threat of continued confinement, indigent
defendants frequently accept plea offers in order to promptly get out
of jail.41 If a detained defendant either refuses to plea out or does not
receive an offer from the prosecution, she can spend weeks or even
longer awaiting trial.42 If, however, the imprisoned defendant accepts
the plea, she can instantly return home with a conditional discharge, a
fine, or “time served.”43 Although accepting the plea often ends the
incarceration period, the conviction will likely have devastating
collateral consequences for the indigent defendant.44 The defendant’s

35. See Patricia A. Reed, Pretrial Bail: A Deprivation of Liberty or Property with
Due Process of Law, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1575, 1581 (1983).
36. See United States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 824, 827 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
37. See generally Mayer, supra note 18.
38. See Pringle, supra note 25.
39. See generally Mayer, supra note 18.
40. See generally Clisura, supra note 19, at 317.
41. See FELLNER, supra note 13, at 32–33.
42. See id. at 31–32.
43. See id. at 32. When a defendant is remanded prior to trial, the “time served”
incarcerated while awaiting trial is subtracted from the sentence the defendant
ultimately receives upon either a plea or a guilty verdict. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §
70.30 (McKinney 2009).
44. See FELLNER, supra note 13, at 32.
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new criminal record can completely hinder the individual’s job
prospects, bar the individual from receiving public housing, and also
potentially cloud a judge’s perception of the individual if they are
arrested again.45
Moreover, the vulnerability of the detained indigent is exacerbated
by the fact that their pretrial incarceration ultimately dictates the
terms of the plea offer.46 Unlike a detained defendant who has little
bargaining power, non-felony defendants who are free pretrial have
no reason to accept an offer that involves jail time.47 As a result, they
will likely fight the case rather than plead out.48 Because the state’s
case typically weakens as time progresses, this strategy gives the
defendant a better chance of being acquitted.49 In fact, the New York
City Criminal Justice Agency found that non-felony pretrial detainees
had a ninety-two percent conviction rate, whereas non-felony
defendants who were released pretrial had a fifty percent conviction
rate.50
B.

For-Profit Bail Bondsmen

Although a defendant who is unable to post bail can hire a bail
bondsman to help front the cost, an indigent accused of a
misdemeanor may be unable to do so.51 Rather than paying the court
once bail is set, the accused can pay a bail bondsman ten percent of
the requisite bail to insure his return.52 When bail is set low, however,
it will be difficult to find a bail bondsman willing to post bond for
such a nominal fee.53 Many bondsmen deem that a profit of only $100
will not be worth the bondsman’s time of potentially locating a “bail
skip.”54 In fact, many bail bond businesses will only post bond for fees
of $1000 or more.55 This is troubling for accused misdemeanants who
cannot afford to post bail, yet did not have bail set in an amount that

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 33.
See id.
See generally Clisura, supra note 19, at 310–11.
See id. at 311.
See id. at 310.
See id. at 310–11.
See id. at 310.
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would be enough to entice a bail bondsman. As a result, the accused
is left to await trial while in jail.
While indigent defendants often have difficulty finding a for-profit
bail bondsman who will post bond on their behalf, accused individuals
who can afford their services view a bail bondsman as a necessary cost
to avoid pretrial incarceration.56 Acting like an insurance company,
the bail bondsman posts collateral on the defendant’s behalf ensuring
that she will attend her next court date.57 If a defendant fails to
appear, the bail bondsman loses the collateral unless or until the “bail
skip” is located and brought to court. Not only is it financially
burdensome to the bail bondsman if the defendant skips bail, but it
also hinders their relationship with insurance underwriters.58
Insurance companies require bail bond businesses to create and
maintain “buildup funds” in the event that a bail skip occurs.59 The
funds, which are comprised of the nonrefundable fees that the bail
bondsman has acquired over the years, will be tapped into whenever
a defendant fails to appear.60 In order to continue operating as a bail
bond business, the bondsman is required by their insurance company
to have a “buildup fund” that surpasses a certain dollar threshold.61 If
a “buildup fund” is routinely dipped into to post bond for bail skips,
then the insurance company will likely prevent the bondsman from
bailing out future defendants.62 It is imperative, therefore, that the
bail bondsman promptly locates the bail skip and returns her to the
state’s custody.63
Initially, the bondsman hopes that the police are able to find
the defendant.64 In reality, however, the police lack the time and
resources to locate every bail skip.65 As the time limit for returning
the defendant draws nearer, which is usually ninety to 180 days after

56. See Ralph Thomas, The Bail Bond Recovery Business, BAIL ENFORCEMENT
RESOURCE CENTER, http://pimall.com/nais/n.bailrec.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2013).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
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the defendant fails to appear,66 the bondsman may hire a bounty
hunter to locate the bail skip and return her to the state’s custody.67
While the cost for hiring a bounty hunter is steep, a bail bondsman’s
incentive to locate and return the bail skip often compels them to pay
the fee.68 Not only is there a monetary incentive for the bail
bondsman to return the defendant, but his insurance company will
forbid him from running his business if he continues to post bail for
defendants who ultimately warrant.69
C.

Attorneys Posting Bail for Their Clients and Attendant
Ethical Concerns

Criminal defense attorneys recognize the disadvantages their
clients face when they are unable to post bail70 and, as a result, often
seek to post bail on their behalf. By bailing out their clients,
attorneys inherit “a financial interest in the outcome of a case” that
will only end when their client has either attended all of her court
dates or is returned to the state’s custody.71 Although the Ethics
Committee has stated that it is possible for an attorney to ethically
post bail for a client when she reasonably believes that a conflict of
interest will not arise, the Committee acknowledges that “[o]ther than
in relatively unusual circumstances”72 a conflict of interest will exist:
[A] lawyer may post, or arrange for the posting of, a bond to secure
the release from custody of a client whom the lawyer represents in
the matter with respect to which the client has been detained, but
only in those rare circumstances in which there is no significant risk
that her representation of the client will be materially limited by her
personal interest in recovering the amount advanced.73

These “rare circumstances” include when (1) the amount of money
is so nominal that it is of no consequence to the attorney, (2) the
lawyer posting bail is a close friend of the clients, and reasonably
66. See Alex Tabarrok, The Bounty Hunter’s Pursuit of Justice, WILSON Q.,
Winter 2011, at 56, available at http://www.wilsonquarterly.com/sites/default/files/
articles/WQ_VOL35_W_2011_Article_05_2.pdf.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See Thomas, supra note 56.
70. See discussion supra Part I.A.
71. See Dayla S. Pepi & Donna D. Bloom, Take the Money or Run: The Risky
Business of Acting as Both Your Client’s Lawyer and Bail Bondsman, 37 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 933, 961 (2006).
72. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004).
73. Id.
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expects to be reimbursed, (3) the lawyer agrees in writing that she will
not exercise her right to legal recourse against the client, and (4) the
lawyer reasonably believes that the client will almost certainly make
her court date.74 If the situation fails to fall neatly into one of the
enumerated circumstances, it is still possible that an attorney may
ethically post bail for a client.75 When determining whether it is
unethical for an attorney to do so, the ABA examines “the particular
facts surrounding the lawyer-client relationship; the lawyer
contemplating posting a bond on behalf of a client is permitted to
take into account the totality of circumstances in deciding whether a
conflict of interest will arise should the lawyer so act.”76
Although several states do not explicitly preclude attorneys from
posting bail for their clients, state Bar associations typically condemn
the practice and insist that attorneys should avoid acting as their
client’s bondsman.77 While there is no express ban on the practice in
New York, attorneys in the state are not allowed to profit from
posting bail for their clients.78 Other states such as Wisconsin, North
Carolina, and Michigan, on the other hand, have statutes that
unequivocally bar attorneys from providing bail for their clients, and
even punish perpetrators of the law for misconduct.79
Even though the practice of an attorney doubling as her client’s
bondsman is viewed unfavorably by both the ABA and most states,
some jurisdictions make an exception for indigent defendants.80 In
fact, even jurisdictions that explicitly prohibit attorneys from posting
bail for their clients, such as Michigan, recognize an exception for
indigent clients: “[b]ecause a lawyer representing an indigent
client does not expect the client to repay him, the conflict of interest
concern that is usually at issue when a lawyer posts a bond on behalf
of a client does not arise.”81 By posting bail for an indigent client, the

74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Deborah Markowitz, The Attorney’s Query: May a Lawyer Ethically Post
a Bond or Serve as a Surety on Behalf of a Client?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 959,
969 (2005).
77. See, John Caher, Lawyer’s Offer to Cover Client’s Bail Raises Ethical
Concerns, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 2012, at 2.
78. N.Y. INS. LAW § 6804(c) (McKinney 2009).
79. See Caher, supra note 77, at 2 (citing State Bar of Wis. Comm. on Prof’l
Ethics, Formal Op. E-96-1 (1996); N.C. State Bar Ethics Comm., Op. 173 (1994);
State Bar of Mich. Prof’l Ethics Comm. RI-65 (1990)).
80. See Markowitz, supra note 76, at 963 n.24.
81. Id.
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attorney “acquiesces in having the amount used to pay the costs and
agrees either not to be reimbursed at all or to look only to the
proceeds of the recovery for reimbursement.”82 Devoid of a financial
interest that they expect to attain, the attorney is thereby not
conflicted between representing her client and reacquiring her
collateral. In addition, New York, New Jersey, and several other
states83 explicitly allow attorneys to pay court costs and expenses of
litigation, which bail is frequently considered,84 for indigent clients.
D. The Bronx Freedom Fund: The Bronx Defenders’
Alternative to “For-Profit” Bail Bondsmen
Critics of New York’s bail system insist that bail essentially “serves
as a de facto sentence before trial” for indigent defendants.85 As
opposed to upholding the country’s firm commitment to “innocent
until proven guilty,” bail “reflexively reflect[s] a presumption of
guilt.”86 By effectively detaining indigent individuals for extended
periods of time prior to a finding of guilt, the bail system is
“essentially sentence first, disposition second.”87
As a result,
adversaries of the current bail system, including Chief Judge Jonathan
Lippman of the New York Court of Appeals, have encouraged the
state to adopt alternatives to “for-profit” bail bondsman.88
In an effort to provide bail for indigent clients who would
otherwise be subjected to pretrial detention, The Bronx Defenders
created the Bronx Freedom Fund, a non-profit corporation, in 2007.89
The Freedom Fund, which was comprised of grant money and
charitable donations,90 was “formed for the purposes of supporting
indigent clients of the Bronx Defenders . . . and helping them avoid
the cost of short jail sentences”91 by posting bail for certain clients.92

82. State Bar of Mich. Prof’l Ethics Comm., Op. RI-91 (1991).
83. Financial Assistance to Clients, 51 Laws. Man. On Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) 801 (2012), available at http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/
litigationnews/top_stories/docs/ABA_Manual_Financial_Assistance.pdf.
84. Id.
85. Buettner, supra note 7.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. See id.
89. See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *4
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009); Jarrett Murphy, Awaiting Justice: The Punishing Price of
NYC’s Bail System, CITY LIMITS, Fall 2007, at 4, 29.
90. See Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *3.
91. Id. at *4.
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In order to tap funds from the Freedom Fund, attorneys at the Bronx
Defenders first referred their client’s case to Zoe Towns, a nonlawyer who was the sole employee of the charitable organization. Ms.
Towns then screened the referred individual and determined whether
the Fund would post bail on the client’s behalf.93
The Freedom Fund listed four factors that ought to be considered
when making this determination: (1) the individual must first be a
client of the Bronx Defenders; (2) bail must be set in an amount no
greater than $1500; (3) the top charge on the accusatory instrument
must be a misdemeanor or a non-violent felony; and (4) the CJA
score, which is a report filed with the court that uses a number of
factors to determine the defendant’s “flight risk,” must be at least
three.94
While the four factors helped guide Ms. Towns’
determination of whether the defendant should qualify for bail

92. See id. at *3.
93. See id. at *5.
94. See id. at *4. At arraignments, New York City courts use a point system (CJA
form) to help predict whether a defendant exhibits a heightened risk of flight.
QUDSIA SIDDIQI, N.Y.C. CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, AN EVALUATION OF THE NEW
PRETRIAL RELEASE SYSTEM IN NEW YORK CITY: PHASE II OF THE POSTIMPLEMENTATION RESEARCH 1–3 (2005), available at http://www.cjareports.org/
reports/june05.pdf. If the defendant receives a score of seven points or higher, she is
recommended for release. Id. at 10. If the arrestee’s score is between three and six,
the defendant is at a moderate risk of flight. Id. Finally, if the defendant scores
anywhere from negative twelve, the lowest possible score, to two, she is not
recommended for release. Id. Although the judge is not obligated to follow the CJA
form, see id. at 1, it serves as a quick and potentially helpful indication of whether the
defendant is likely to appear. The recommendation system is largely based on a
defendant’s ties to the community. See id. at 4. The six factors that the court utilizes
to determine the defendant’s flight risk include:
1. Does defendant report a NYC area address?
2. Does defendant have a working telephone in his or her residence or a
cellular phone?
3. Is defendant employed, or in school, or training program (or a
combination of these) full time?
4. Does defendant expect someone at arraignment?
5. Does the prior bench warrant count equal zero?
6. Does the open case count equal zero?
Id. at 7. If the defendant’s response to questions one, three, and four are accurate
and verified by the court, the defendant receives one point. See id. at 8–9. If the
defendant does not have the requisite information or provides false information, the
defendant receives negative points. See id. The defendant receives either positive
three points if she has a NYC address, or negative two if she does not. See id. If the
defendant previously warranted (failed to appear to a court date), she receives
negative five points. See id. If the defendant was either never arrested or attended all
of her court dates when she was, she receives positive five points. See id. at 8. Lastly,
if the defendant has another open criminal case, she will lose a point. See id.
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assistance, she had permission from the Fund’s Board of Directors to
post bail in excess of $1500 in certain situations so long as she
reasonably believed it to be appropriate.95 Despite her level of
discretion, she did not tap into the Freedom Fund’s resources every
time a Bronx Defenders attorney referred a client.96 Instead, she used
the CJA report and any information that the attorney gathered from
working with the defendant to determine if the client qualified for
bail assistance.97 When she agreed to use the Fund’s resources, she
strived to maintain contact with the defendant and periodically
inform the accused that if she did not show up for her court date, the
bail money would be forfeited and thus be unavailable for future
clients.
Of the 130 individuals that the Bronx Freedom Fund bailed out
from 2007 to 2009, ninety-five percent of the defendants made their
court date.98 None of the 130 defendants were ultimately sentenced
to jail, and nearly fifty percent of the defendants had their cases
dismissed or adjourned.99 While the data accentuates that “[w]ithout
access to bail, poor people who would otherwise go free were
pleading guilty and filling jail cells,”100 the legality of the Bronx
Freedom Fund was eventually scrutinized in People v. Miranda.
In People v. Miranda, the Bronx Supreme Court held that by acting
as both a bail bond business and an insurance business, the Fund
contravened public policy because it was neither properly licensed
nor supervised by the Commissioner of Insurance.101 The court
underscored that the Bronx Freedom Fund did not qualify for an
Insurance Law exemption that would have enabled the Fund to
continue their practices without a license.102 Instead, by avoiding all
oversight, the Freedom Fund undermined the need to “strict[ly]
control and overs[ee]” the country’s bail bond business.103
While the court ultimately accepted the District Attorney’s
argument that the Fund violated public policy, they failed to issue a
ruling on whether the close connection between the Bronx Defenders
95. See Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *8.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Pringle, supra note 25.
99. See id.
100. Nick Pinto, Making Bail Better, VILLAGE VOICE (Oct. 10 2012),
http://www.villagevoice.com/2012-10-10/news/making-bail-better/.
101. See Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *15.
102. See id.
103. See id. at *12.
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attorneys and the Freedom Fund elicited an ethical violation.104 In
arguing for the Fund to be shut down, the Bronx District Attorney
alleged that the close legal ties between Ms. Towns and the Bronx
Defenders attorneys, which included Ms. Towns’ unchecked access to
legal files for Bronx Defenders clients, violated standards of ethics.105
Although the presumption is that attorneys can ethically provide
bail for their clients in only unusual circumstances,106 the court stated
that there is “no ABA opinion that forbids an attorney from being
involved in the posting of bail where no financial interests are
implicated.”107 Unlike other attorneys who use their own funds to bail
out their clients, the Bronx Defenders attorneys relied on donations
from third parties to post bail for their clients.108 Without a tangible
financial loss at stake, it is plausible that the attorneys were not
conflicted between recovering their collateral and representing their
client. Similarly, the New York State Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics does not provide an explicit answer on whether
this practice is ethical.109 Without either an ABA or a New York
Ethics opinion directly addressing the issue, the court left the ethical
concerns unresolved.
E.

The Charitable Bail Bonds Bill

Three years after the Bronx Freedom Fund was deemed unlawful,
New York legislatures ratified the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill.110 The
Bill empowers charitable organizations to provide bail for indigents
accused of misdemeanors provided that bail is set at no more than
$2000, the charitable group is registered as a 501(c)(3) organization,
and that the organization does not charge a fee for its services.111 The
purpose of the law is to provide accused indigents with the
opportunity to avoid pretrial incarceration by enabling charitable

104. See generally id. at *19 (“Since there is no clear legal precedent covering the
unique and limited facts revealed in this bail hearing, this Court cannot issue a ruling
on the ethical question raised by the People.”).
105. Id. at *16.
106. ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004).
107. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *18.
108. Id. at *21.
109. See discussion supra Part I.C.
110. Press Release, supra note 31.
111. Id.
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organizations to post bail on their behalf.112 In doing so, the Bill
exempts charitable bail organizations from certain licensing
requirements.113
Even though the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill became law in July
2012, its effectiveness is yet to be determined.114 As of January 2013,
Robin Steinberg, executive director of the Bronx Defenders, “said
the Bronx fund is gearing up to begin providing bail money again for
indigent defendants once the state completes promulgating rules
under the 2012 law.”115
Although it will take some time before we can discern how indigent
defendants are affected by the legislation,116 it is possible that the Bill
will be less effective than anticipated. While it is not the focus of this
Note, it remains possible that criminal justice concerns will compel
judges to simply reject bail posted by the charitable organization.
More likely, though, is the possibility that the practice will be
regarded as unethical. If the New York State Bar Association deems
that attorneys at legal services organizations violate their ethical
responsibilities when they create or team-up with charitable
organizations that provide bail for their clients, then the practice will
soon be halted.
If ethical concerns preclude legal services
organizations from implementing charitable funds or working with an
existing one, then how else will an indigent defendant benefit from
the new Bill?
While ethical concerns will not prevent charitable groups that are
not affiliated with legal services organizations from posting bail for
certain indigent defendants, at this point it is unclear whether nonlegal charitable organizations will commit the time, energy, and
resources to implement a fund that either solicits donations or uses
the organization’s resources to bail out an individual they may know
nothing about. In fact, despite the Bill’s ratification nearly six months
earlier, Robin Steinberg acknowledged that “she knew of no other
charitable organization that plans to offer bail.”117 Unlike non-legal
charitable groups, legal services organizations similar to the Bronx

112. See Cindy Rodriguez, Charities to Play Bail Bondsman Role, WNYC NEWS
(July 23, 2012), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2012/jul/23/charities-nowallowed-post-bail-poor-new-york-state/.
113. Press Release, supra note 31.
114. S. S07752, 2012 Senate, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2012).
115. Stashenko, supra note 26, at 7.
116. See generally id.
117. Id. at 7.
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Defenders are likely eager to implement their own bail fund.118 Public
defense attorneys are undoubtedly aware of the harsh consequences
their clients face when they are detained pretrial,119 and will likely
pursue any opportunity that lawfully gives their client a better chance
of being acquitted.120 As a result, forecasting the effectiveness of the
Bill is largely based on whether it is ethical for attorneys at legal
services organizations, like those at the Bronx Defenders, to either
implement their own charitable fund or work closely with another
organization that has their own.
F.

Attorney-Client Privilege

A central tenet of the American legal system is that attorneys are
afforded the right to withhold information about their client pursuant
to the attorney-client privilege.121 In order to facilitate full and honest
interaction between attorneys and their clients, it is imperative that
certain communications are kept confidential.122 While this privilege
is frequently recognized as valid only between an attorney and her
client, New York law extends the privilege to communications
between attorneys and their non-attorney colleagues and employees
in certain situations.123
Although Ms. Towns was not an attorney, she was provided with
unfettered access to legal files for all clients that were referred to the
Fund for bail assistance. In addition, the attorneys handed Ms.
Towns information about the defendant that was gathered during
attorney-client conversations.124 As a result, she may be able to
invoke the attorney-client privilege to “prevent[] any fact-finding
about what the individuals who sought the legal advice told. . . other
[Bronx Defenders] lawyers.”125

118. See Pinto, supra note 100. Shortly after the Bill was passed, the Brooklyn
Defender Services began preparing for the creation of their own Bail Fund. Id.
119. See Clisura, supra note 19, at 317; see also discussion supra Part I.A.
120. Being detained pretrial drastically impedes the misdemeanant’s potential for
obtaining an acquittal. See FELLNER, supra note 13, at 33–34.
121. See Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 15 Misc. 3d 308, 315 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007).
122. See Eli Wald, Loyalty in Limbo: The Peculiar Case of Attorneys’ Loyalty to
Clients, 40 ST. MARY’S L.J. 909, 923 (2009).
123. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 4503 (McKinney 2007); see also People v. Miranda, No.
012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009) (quoting
People v. Osorio, 549 N.E.2d 1183, 1185–86 (N.Y. 1989)).
124. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *17.
125. Id. at *13.
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If the attorney-client privilege applies to Ms. Towns, the employee
cannot be compelled to testify about certain communications the
client had with her attorney.126 More importantly, if the Bronx
Defenders attorneys treated Ms. Towns as if she was governed by the
privilege, then she was likely an agent of the Bronx Defenders.127
Non-lawyers who are agents of either the attorney or the client must
uphold a duty of confidentiality to the client, just as attorneys are
required.128 Pursuant to Rule 5.3 of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, attorneys must hold their agents to the professional
obligations of the lawyer. 129 If the Bronx Defenders attorneys did not
want the non-attorneys to be bound by the obligations of the lawyer,
then they should not have shared the client’s file with them.130 In fact,
if the attorneys revealed the client’s confidential information to a
non-agent, they likely breached their duty of confidentiality to the
client.131
From an ethical perspective, it is of great benefit to the client if the
non-legal employee is an agent of the attorney because otherwise the
client’s confidential information would be at risk.132 That agency
relationship, however, may not be conducive to the responsibilities of
a bail bondsman, who must disclose all information, even if it is
contrary to the defendant’s interests, in order to properly perform her
job. Although it is necessary to establish whether Ms. Towns was an
agent of a Bronx Defenders attorney, this determination is a matter
of contract and agency law, and thus not the focus of this Note. But,
as the court held in People v. Miranda, if there was no such agency
relationship in place between the attorneys and Ms. Towns, disclosing
the client’s file to the non-attorney would likely cause an ethical
problem.133 As a result, Part II and Part III examine whether nonlegal employees working for charitable organizations, like Ms. Towns,
could ethically post bail for certain individuals if they are considered
agents of the attorney.

126. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4503 (McKinney 2007).
127. See generally Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *17.
128. See Delta Fin. Corp. v. Morrison, 15 Misc. 3d 308, 316–17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2007).
129. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2009).
130. See id.
131. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009).
132. See id.
133. People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *17
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
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II. ENUMERATING THE ETHICAL CONCERNS THAT EXIST WHEN
ATTORNEYS AT LEGAL SERVICES ORGANIZATIONS WORK
CLOSELY WITH CHARITABLE BAIL FUNDS
Although the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill enables charitable
organizations to implement funds that provide bail for certain
criminal defendants, attorneys’ involvement with bail funds will
continue to be scrutinized because ethical questions still loom. The
practice of serving as both a bail bondsman and an attorney for a
criminal defendant raises ethical questions in four areas: (1) the
potential “conflict with the client involving the lawyer’s own
potentially adverse pecuniary [or personal] interest; (2) protection of
client confidentiality; (3) improper solicitation of clients; and (4)
financial relationships between a lawyer and his client.”134 If
charitable bail funds run afoul of any of these ethical concerns, the
practice could soon be halted.
A. Conflict of Interest
Although the New York State Bar Association Committee on
Professional Ethics has only explicitly precluded attorneys from
posting bail for their clients when they profit from doing so,135 there is
a presumption that posting bail for one’s own client creates a conflict
of interest for the attorney pursuant to Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.136 When an attorney posts bail for a client, she
contracts with the state to guarantee the appearance of her client at
future court dates.137 If the client fails to appear, the attorney turned
bail bondsman must forfeit the money.138 The contract, therefore,
“provides a financial obligation where the lawyer’s interests could
potentially conflict with the interests of the client.”139
An attorney’s “basic duty . . . is to serve as the accused’s counselor
and advocate with courage and devotion and to render effective,
quality representation.”140 An attorney’s ability to do so, however,
could be tempered by a desire to recover their pecuniary interest.
134. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 976–77.
135. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993).
136. See discussion supra Part I.C. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004).
137. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004).
138. Id.
139. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 978.
140. Id. at 983 (quoting JOHN M. BURKHOFF, CRIMINAL DEFENSE ETHICS 754 (2d
ed. 2005)).
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The South Carolina Ethics Advisory Committee, for example, opined
that “by obtaining a financial stake in the handling of a particular
case, an attorney might be tempted to push his client into accepting a
settlement offer which the attorney would ordinarily advise be turned
down.”141 By encouraging her client to accept the settlement, the
attorney is assured that her collateral is returned, but is shunning her
responsibility to act in the best interest of the client. Occupying both
roles, therefore, could serve as a challenge for the attorney and as a
detriment to the client.
An attorney’s pecuniary interest is not the only interest that is
capable of hindering her ability to diligently represent her client. An
attorney’s unyielding loyalty to her client serves as both a cornerstone
of the attorney-client relationship142 and as the “most fundamental of
all fiduciary duties the legal profession owes to its clients.”143 “This
loyalty can only be properly carried out,” however, “if a lawyer fully
comprehends that any other interest of the lawyer, whether personal
or professional, has the potential to compromise, if not destroy, the
lawyer’s necessary dedication to vindicating the client’s legal
position.”144 Therefore, anything that dilutes the attorney’s loyalty to
her client should not be permitted. When evaluating whether an
attorney’s representation could be adversely affected, it is necessary
to examine whether the attorney’s personal interests, and not just
those that are pecuniary, could impede with her ability to diligently
represent her client.145
B. Duty of Confidentiality
Distinct from the attorney-client privilege is an attorney’s ethical
obligation to uphold her duty of confidentiality to her client.146 The
duty of confidentiality applies not merely to matters communicated in
confidence by the client, but also to all information relating to the
client’s representation, whatever its source.147 The ethical obligation
141. S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 90-02 (1990).
142. See Wald, supra note 122, at 911.
143. Lawrence Fox, The Gang of Thirty-Three Taking the Wrecking Ball to Client
Loyalty, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 567, 570 (2012), available at http://yalelawjournal.org/
images/pdfs/1063.pdf.
144. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 975 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.7(a)(2) (2013).
146. Id. r. 1.6.
147. Id. r. 1.6(a)(3). An attorney has an obligation not to disclose “any
information that is likely to be embarrassing or detrimental to the client . . . or
information that the client has requested be kept confidential.” Id.
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of a lawyer not to disclose the client’s confidential information “not
only facilitates the full development of facts essential to proper
representation of the client but also encourages non-lawyers to seek
early legal assistance.”148 If attorneys freely revealed their clients’
confidences, the public’s trust in the legal system would surely
wane.149
A bail bondsman is a licensed agent of the state who is
contractually obliged to satisfy a number of responsibilities.150 First
and foremost, the bondsman must make sure that her client attends
all of her court dates.151 In the event of a bail skip, the bondsman
must actively assist in locating the defendant or else forfeit her
collateral, and eventually her license if her clients continue to
warrant.152 Although an arrest warrant is often issued for the
defendant after she fails to appear, police officers typically do not
attempt to locate and detain the defendant, especially for minor
offenses.153 Instead, it is typically left to the bondsman to find the
defendant and subsequently return her to the state’s custody.154
Because the bondsman is not constrained by the same ethical
limitations as an attorney, the bondsman may freely disclose the
client’s personal information. Unlike a licensed bail bondsman,
whose main responsibility is to insure that the defendant returns to
court, an attorney who posts her client’s bail must also uphold her
duty of confidentiality to the client. But because the “rule of
confidentiality is generally thought to prohibit a lawyer from
revealing information concerning the whereabouts of his client,”155 an
attorney may be precluded from revealing personal information
about a client who recently jumped bail.
In addition, if the court orders that the bondsman disclose the
whereabouts of the defendant, they must do so.156 Because no
privilege attaches to communications between a non-attorney bail
bondsman and an arrested individual, the court can compel a
bondsman to provide information regarding the defendant and her
148. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 405 (1975).
149. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 2 (2009).
150. See N.Y. INS. LAW § 6805 (McKinney 2009).
151. See id.
152. See Thomas, supra note 56.
153. See id.
154. Id. While the bondsman typically tries to locate the defendant herself, she has
the option of hiring a bounty hunter to do the job for her. Id.
155. State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Op. 95-02 (1995).
156. See discussion infra Part III.B.3.
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whereabouts. An attorney, on the other hand, initially may not be
compelled by the court to reveal her client’s confidential
information.157 This could pose a problem for the court, who may
immediately need information from the charitable organization in
order to locate and return the bail skip. Thus, issues of client
confidentiality could put an attorney serving as a client’s bondsman in
an ethical quandary. Must an attorney remain loyal to her client, or
can she ethically reveal privileged information about her client in the
event of a bail skip?
C. Improper Solicitation of Clients
Attorneys who also serve as their clients’ bail bondsmen may act
unethically if they use their practice of posting bail for their clients as
a means to acquire business.158 Because posting bail is entirely
unrelated to the legal services that an attorney can provide,159 the
New York State Bar Association held that a bail
bond business operated by an attorney “may not be used to solicit
The Ethics Opinion
clients for the lawyer’s law practice.”160
determined that an attorney committed an ethical violation when he
sought to induce clients by paying for a billboard that read “Why pay
for a Bondsman when you can get a Lawyer? ‘I will get you out of jail
and defend you’ All Bail Bond Fees Apply to Attorney Fees.”161
Furthermore, the rule against providing financial assistance to a
client162 was designed in part to prevent clients from selecting
attorneys based on which lawyers are willing to provide the most
financial assistance to the client.163 Although financial assistance from
an attorney to a client is sometimes permissible in New York,164 as
soon as the practice becomes widely known by the public and is seen
as a tool to acquire new clients, then it may be deemed unethical. By
routinely posting bail for their clients, an attorney could be
improperly soliciting clients to seek her services simply because of the

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 7.1 (2013).
Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 983.
Id. (citing N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 647 (1993)).
Id. at 989.
See discussion infra Part II.D.
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2009).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.8(e)(1)–(2) (2013).
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attorney’s willingness to offer financial assistance.165 These attorneys
are then able to enjoy a competitive advantage over other lawyers for
reasons that are distinct from the quality of service that they provide.
The bar has typically viewed competitive advantages that are
unrelated to the attorney’s quality of service unfavorably.166 In ABA
Opinion 288, for example, the Committee held that financial
assistance to benefit an injured client was unethical once the practice
was publicized because it “constitutes a holding out by the lawyer of
an improper inducement to clients to employ him.”167 Similarly,
in Carroll, a lawyer was disciplined for purchasing a vehicle for a
destitute client in advance of litigation because “naturally a client will
retain the lawyer who makes advances without regard to quality.”168
The practice of attorneys posting bail for their clients could be
unethical, therefore, if viewed as a tool to woo individuals to retain
their services. In Texas, for example, where there is no express
prohibition against acting as both a client’s bondsman and attorney,
the Bar was nonetheless “particularly concerned with the potential
for the business of acting as surety on criminal bonds to easily become
a feeder to the attorney’s practice of law.”169 Consequently, it is
imperative that attorneys in Texas clearly accentuate that the practice
of posting bail for their clients is not “at all motivated by a desire to
advertise or solicit.”170
D. Improper Financial Assistance and Entering into a
Business Transaction with the Client
Rule 1.8(e) of the New York Rules of Professional Conduct
prohibits attorneys from providing financial assistance to a client in
connection with pending or contemplated litigation.171 This restriction
on providing financial assistance to a client could be particularly
devastating for indigent clients. An attorney, for example, is
forbidden from making or guaranteeing loans to her clients for living
165. James Moliterno, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The “Acquisition of an
Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation” Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 223,
235 (2003) (citing Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial
Ethics, Op. 391 (1936)).
166. See id.
167. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
168. Id. at 251 (citing In re Carroll, 602 P.2d 461, 467 (1979)).
169. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 991–92 (quoting State Bar of Tex. Comm. on
Interpretation of the Canons of Ethics, Op. 347 (1969)).
170. Id. at 992.
171. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.8(e) (2013).
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expenses, and from “indemnify[ing] the client for the client’s failure
to meet her own obligation[s].”172 This restriction is especially
problematic if a defendant becomes aware of the fact that the plaintiff
is impoverished. As a litigation strategy, the defendant could
intentionally delay trial, thereby increasing the cost of the litigation
for the poor plaintiff. The increased cost could then preclude the
plaintiff from paying for certain living expenses. And because the
plaintiff is forbidden from acquiring a loan from her attorney, she
may be compelled to terminate the litigation altogether in order to
save money.173
Recognizing the vulnerability of both indigent plaintiffs and
defendants, the ABA maintains that, even in the absence of
repayment upon recovery, “a lawyer representing an indigent client
on a pro bono basis may pay court costs and reasonable litigation
expenses on behalf of the client.”174 Although this carve-out enables
attorneys to provide financial assistance in certain situations,
identifying a “court cost” or “reasonable litigation expense” leads to
some disagreement. While bail, for example, is not an expense of
litigation in Maryland, it is viewed as such in Oregon.175 Similarly,
the ABA has explicitly held that “a client’s bail can be considered
among ‘court costs and expenses of litigation.’”176 The New York
State Bar, though, has not addressed whether bail is considered a
litigation expense.177
Determining whether attorneys violate their ethical responsibility
under Rule 1.8(e), therefore, likely comes down to whether posting
bail is considered a litigation expense. Another related concern is
whether attorneys enter into a business transaction with their clients

172. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 852 (2011).
173. See generally Hope Todd, Helping the Indigent Client: A Threat to Lawyer
Independence?, D.C. BAR (Nov. 2010), http://www.dcbar.org/for_lawyers/resources/
publications/washington_lawyer/november_2010/ethics.cfm.
174. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e)(2) (2013).
175. Financial Assistance to Clients, supra note 83.
176. Clisura, supra note 19, at 344 (quoting ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l
Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004); see id. at 344 n.244 (“[A] lawyer may post,
or arrange for the posting of, a bond to secure the release from custody of a client
whom the lawyer represents . . . in those rare circumstances in which there is no
significant risk that her representation of the client will be materially limited by her
personal interest in recovering the amount advanced.” (quoting ABA Comm. on
Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04-432 (2004)). The jurisdictions that
have addressed whether bail is a litigation expense are split. See id.
177. See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *18
n.25 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
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pursuant to Rule 1.8(a) by working closely with the charitable bail
fund.
Rule 1.8(a) states that only in a few rare circumstances can an
attorney “enter into a business transaction with a client if they have
differing interests therein and if the client expects the lawyer to
exercise professional judgment therein for the protection of the
client.”178 Although Rule 1.8 does not explicitly define “business
transaction,” the comments state that business transactions do not
include “standard commercial transactions between the lawyer and
the client for products or services that the client generally markets to
others.”179 The Committee makes this distinction because “[i]n such
transactions, the lawyer has no advantage in dealing with the
client, and the restrictions are . . . unnecessary and impracticable.”180
If agreeing to post bail for certain clients is considered a “business
transaction,” the practice will soon be halted.
III. ANTICIPATING HOW ETHICS C OMMITTEES WILL RESOLVE
THE E THICAL C ONCERNS
A. Does a Conflict of Interests Exist when Attorneys at Legal
Services Organizations Work Closely with a Charitable
Corporation that Posts Bail for the Attorney’s Clients?
When attorneys post bail for their clients, the most obvious
concern is that the attorney’s ability to act in the best interest of the
client will be compromised by the attorney’s desire to recoup their
financial investment.181 Although the prevailing view is that attorneys
should refrain from acting as bondsmen for their clients in order to
avoid a conflict of interest,182 “this view rests almost entirely on the
financial relationship that exists when an attorney posts his or her
own funds as bail for a client, and the risk that the attorney’s personal
financial interests will conflict with his or her ability to act in
”
the client’s interests. 183 Attorneys working at non-profit legal services
organizations, like those at the Bronx Defenders, are able to
circumvent that conflict by using the charitable donations in the

178. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.8(a) (2013).
179. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 1 (2009).
180. Id.
181. See generally ABA Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 04432 (2004).
182. See discussion supra Part I.C.
183. Clisura, supra note 19, at 343.
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Fund, rather than their own finances, to post bail for their clients.184
Without a pecuniary interest at stake, the attorney’s ability to
ardently represent her client is not hindered by a desire to reacquire
her money. But even though none of the attorney’s own financial
interests are implicated, an attorney’s involvement with a charitable
bail fund could still be unethical if an attorney’s personal interests
hinder her ability to diligently represent her client.185
Although the Bronx Defenders attorneys did not have a monetary
interest at stake, Rule 1.7(a)(2) is not limited to those attorneys
whose representation is tempered by a pecuniary interest. Under
Rule 1.7(a)(2), “a concurrent conflict of interest exists when a
reasonable lawyer would perceive a significant risk that the
representation will be materially limited or that the lawyer’s
independent professional judgment on behalf of a client will be
adversely affected . . . by the lawyer’s own financial, business,
property or personal interests.”186 So long as the arrangement is
“adverse to the interests or [is] to the disadvantage of present or
former clients,” the arrangement will be deemed to impermissibly
conflict with the interests of the attorney.187
Even though the Bronx Defenders attorneys are likely interested in
the continued operation of the Bronx Freedom Fund, there is little
that suggests that their ability to diligently represent their clients
would wane. When an attorney with a pecuniary interest forfeits
bond, the attorney suffers a tangible financial loss.188 If a client who
qualifies for assistance from the Fund skips bail, the “loss” is felt by a
third party who has implicitly agreed not to be reimbursed by
donating to the Freedom Fund. Unlike the tangible loss that
attorneys who post bail surely seek to avoid, the third-party donators
will not have any indication whether their donation is returned to the
Freedom Fund or forfeited to the court. In addition, the Bronx
Defenders did not have either an express or informal policy in place
that compelled attorneys to do whatever was necessary to insure that

184. See People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
185. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2009).
186. Id.
187. Ramon Mullerat, Lawyer’s Conflict of Interest 1, 9 (Nov. 26, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.fbe.org/IMG/pdf/Lawyers_
conflicts_of_interest.pdf.
188. See generally S.C. Bar Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 90-02 (1990).
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the collateral was returned to the Freedom Fund.189 Without a
commitment to the third-party donators to make sure that the clients
attended their court dates, the Bronx Defenders attorneys would not
be “conflict[ed] between the client’s interests and those of third
parties to whom the lawyer owes obligations.”190
Furthermore, if the client’s appearance is absolutely vital to the
continued operation of the Bronx Freedom Fund, then it is likely that
the attorney has committed an ethical violation. A Bronx Defenders
attorney, for example, might feel compelled to act adversely to her
client’s interests191 if the provisions governing the Bronx Freedom
Fund held that once the first client missed her court date, the Fund
would be shut down. For the eighteen months that the Freedom
Fund was operating, however, five percent of the clients subsequently
failed to make their court date.192 But rather than terminating the
Freedom Fund or sanctioning the attorneys for recommending a
client who subsequently failed to appear, the Freedom Fund
remained in operation.193 This suggests that neither the Bronx
Defenders attorneys nor Ms. Towns were under any undue pressure
to make sure that their clients made their court dates. Similarly, an
attorney may act unethically if she knew that the Fund was financially
limited, and thereby needed to reacquire the collateral in order to
provide bail for future clients. As of May 2009, however, the Fund
had over $70,000 available for bail, and there was no indication that
the Bronx attorneys were compelled to preserve the resources in the
Fund.194
Without either a financial relationship between the attorneys and
their clients, or an express or implied obligation compelling the
attorneys to ensure that the Fund’s resources were reacquired, the
Bronx Defenders attorneys were not involved in an arrangement that
would lead them to act without regard to their clients best interest.195
It is likely, therefore, that those involved with the Bronx Freedom
Fund conducted themselves ethically pursuant to Rule 1.7(a)(2).

189. See generally, People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op.
51560(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
190. Mullerat, supra note 187, at 9.
191. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2009).
192. See Pringle, supra note 25.
193. See id.
194. Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *8.
195. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. 10 (2009).
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B. Can an Attorney Uphold Her Duty of Confidentiality
While Serving as Her Client’s Bondsman?
When a criminal defendant fails to appear, a judge may press the
defendant’s attorney about why her client did not appear and where
she is staying. While the attorney is certainly precluded from making
knowingly false statements to the judge pursuant to the attorney’s
duty of candor,196 the attorney must uphold her duty of confidentiality
to her client even in the wake of the judge’s questioning.197 If a forprofit bail bondsman posted bail on the defendant’s behalf, the court
may contact the bondsman and ask for certain information about the
defendant.198 When a bondsman posts bail for a defendant, she asks
for personal information that would help locate the defendant in the
event that she skips bail.199 Because there is no privilege between
these communications, a bondsman can freely provide this
information to anyone, including a bounty hunter, a police officer, or
the court.200 This disclosed information may be helpful to the court
when deciding whether to issue a warrant or to provide the defendant
with another opportunity to appear in court. The information could
also be helpful to law enforcement, who may be instructed to locate
the defendant and return her to the state’s custody.
Attorneys serving as a client’s bondsman, on the other hand, may
be unable to voluntarily disclose this information to anyone other
than their agents.201
Generally, information about a client’s
whereabouts should not be disclosed by a lawyer: “information
respecting a client’s whereabouts ‘gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate’ squarely
falls within the general ethical obligation of preserving the
confidentiality of client secrets.”202 The court, therefore, may be
unable to receive information about the client that they normally
attain from a for-profit bondsman. As a result, it is necessary to
determine the breadth of the duty of confidentiality in order to

196. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 3.3(a) (2013).
197. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R .1.6 (2009).
198. Tonya Page, What Happens if Someone Fails to Appear in Court?, FAMILY
BAIL BLOG (Apr. 5, 2010), http://www.familybailbonds.com/blog/2010/04/whathappens-if-someone-fails-to-appear-in-court.
199. Frequently Asked Questions, ALL COUNTY BAIL BONDS, LLC,
http://www.bailthejail.com/index.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2013).
200. See generally Thomas, supra note 56.
201. See discussion supra Part II.B.
202. N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 95-702 (1995).
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predict whether an attorney can uphold her ethical responsibilities
under Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, while
also being affiliated to a Fund that posts bail for her clients.

1. Voluntarily Revealing Information Related to a Client’s
Whereabouts Under 1.6(a)
Rule 1.6(a) limits what an attorney may disclose by instructing her
that she may not reveal confidential information about a client to the
client’s disadvantage.203 It is “difficult to imagine, [however] a greater
disadvantage than one’s own attorney playing a significant part in
returning her to confinement.”204 Not only will the disclosed
information assist law enforcement in locating the bail skip, but it will
also likely cause the defendant to relinquish trust in her attorney, and
potentially even the legal system.205 A client’s sense of fairness is
compromised when he “senses that his attorney’s loyalties are
divided” between the client and law enforcement.206 To ensure that
the legal system has any legitimacy, it is necessary that clients believe
that they have diligent attorneys on their side who will not leave them
out to “fend for. . . themselves.”207
Furthermore, an attorney is precluded from revealing confidential
information about the client for the advantage of the lawyer or a third
person.208 When an attorney acts as a client’s bondsman and later
“submits his affidavit to the court detailing his cause for surrendering
the principal, he is most likely relying on privileged information he
acquired in the course of his representation.”209 In doing so, the
attorney is utilizing the information obtained from the client as a tool
to better herself.210 In other words, the attorney “has gained the fee
negotiated at the initial execution of the bail bond and has used the
protected information to relieve himself of any further liability.”211
By placing her responsibilities as a bondsman ahead of her duty of

203.
204.
205.
206.

N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(a) (2013).
Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 988.
See id. at 983.
Timothy Miller, Note, The Attorney’s Duty to Reveal a Client’s Intended
Future Criminal Conduct, 1984 DUKE L.J. 582, 594.
207. Id.
208. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(a).
209. Pepi & Bloom, supra note 71, at 989.
210. See id.
211. Id.
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confidentiality to her client, the attorney has likely run afoul of New
York’s ethical rules.
Although Rule 1.6(a) seems to preclude both the attorney and her
agent from voluntarily disclosing the client’s whereabouts, Rule
1.6(b) carves out exceptions detailing when attorneys can ethically
breach their duty of confidentiality.212 While there is nothing
explicitly allowing an attorney to voluntarily disclose confidential
information about a client who committed bail jumping, there are
several opinions that highlight the scope of 1.6(b).213

2.

Revealing Information Related to a Client’s Whereabouts Under
1.6(b)

An attorney’s duty of confidentiality, which encompasses a client’s
admission of guilt, does not cover a client’s intention to engage in
future criminal conduct.214 Rule 1.6(b)(2) permits an attorney to
reveal his client’s intention to commit a crime so long as the
disclosure is reasonably related to preventing the crime.215 Because
bail jumping is a crime under New York Penal Law § 215.57, an
attorney may reveal her client’s intention to flee if information is
necessary to help law enforcement prevent the crime. This is only
applicable, however, if an attorney is aware of their client’s intention
to commit the crime.216

212. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(b). Rule 1.6(b) provides:
A lawyer may reveal or use confidential information to the extent that the
lawyer reasonably believes necessary: (1) to prevent reasonably certain
death or substantial bodily harm; (2) to prevent the client from committing
a crime; (3) to withdraw a written or oral opinion or representation
previously given by the lawyer and reasonably believed by the lawyer still to
be relied upon by a third person, where the lawyer has discovered that the
opinion or representation was based on materially inaccurate information or
is being used to further a crime or fraud; (4) to secure legal advice about
compliance with these Rules or other law by the lawyer, another lawyer
associated with the lawyer’s firm or the law firm; (5) (i) to defend the lawyer
or the lawyer’s employees and associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct; or (ii) to establish or collect a fee; or (6) when permitted or
required under these Rules or to comply with other law or court order.

Id.
213. See, e.g., Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial
Ethics, Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002); State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Op. 95-02 (1995);
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 405 (1975).
214. Deborah A. Scalise, Attorney Professionalism Forum, 78-Oct. N.Y. ST. B.J.
50, 51 (2006).
215. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(a) cmt. 6C.
216. See id.
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Some jurisdictions broaden the scope of the duty of confidentiality
by requiring attorneys to maintain the confidentiality of all
information relating to the representation of their clients even if,
prior to a client’s court date, an attorney has a strong inclination that
her client will not appear.217 In Arizona, for example, counsel may
reveal the intention of a client not to appear only if: “(1) the attorney
has actual knowledge that the client will not appear; and (2) the act is
willful and not the result of mistake or inadvertence.”218 But because
“it is very difficult for a lawyer to ‘know’ when such unlawful purpose
will actually be carried out, for the client may have a change of
mind,” it will be rare that an attorney is sufficiently certain that her
client intends not to appear.219
An attorney may, however, ethically breach her duty of
confidentiality when a client “is continuing an ongoing criminal
scheme,”220 or is involved in the commission of a crime that is
“continuing.”221 A “continuing crime” has been explained as “one
which, though committed in the past has ramifications or effects that
continue into the future.”222 There is considerable disagreement,
however, about what constitutes as a “past crime,” as opposed to a
“continuing” one.223 Some scholars argue that a literal application of
“continuing crime” “obliterate[s] any meaningful distinction between
past and future conduct.”224 They insist that some “criminal acts that
have occurred in the past [can be] given an indefinitely
contemporaneous aspect by the criminal law.”225 The past offense of
theft, for example, could easily be portrayed as “possession of stolen
property,” while escaping from prison becomes the offense of
“remaining a fugitive.”226 Focusing on the contemporaneous effects
of past offenses enables attorneys to freely divulge private
217. State Bar of Ariz. Ethics Comm., Op. 95-02 (1995).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002); see COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(b)(2).
221. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 405 (1975).
222. Nancy J. Moore, Limits to Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A
“Philosophically Informed” and Comparative Approach to Legal and Medical Ethics,
36 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 177, 243 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted).
223. Id. at 242–43.
224. Id. at 243.
225. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002).
226. See Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002); Moore, supra note 222, at 244–45.
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information about their client’s conduct without any ethical
restraints.227 “[T]o better accomplish the aims of both the client
confidentiality provisions in the Code and of protecting innocent
victims of a client’s criminal conduct,”228 these scholars insist that “the
mere continuation of the harmful effects of an otherwise completed
client wrong” does not render a crime as “continuing.”229 Instead, a
client charged with a crime should be able to freely communicate and
admit guilt to an attorney without any apprehension that the attorney
will subsequently reveal that information.230
Determining whether bail jumping is a “past crime” or a
“continuing crime” impacts whether an attorney serving as a client’s
bondsman may freely reveal information related to the crime. Based
on the New York City Bar’s commitment to protecting a lawyer’s
duty of confidentiality,231 it is unlikely that “bail jumping” will be
deemed a continuous crime. In fact, the New York City Bar has been
reluctant to allow attorneys to breach their duty of confidentiality
even when they have identified a “continuous crime.”232 In 2002, the
Bar interpreted Disciplinary Rule 4-101(C)(3), which was the
precursor to Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, as
forbidding attorneys from disclosing information “based on the
client’s ‘continuous crime’ where the client has already completed
conduct which satisfies all elements of the crime and has sought to
engage the lawyer to defend the client against the criminal charges
relating to that conduct.”233
In an earlier Opinion, the New York State Bar Association
Committee on Professional Ethics shed light on what type of crime
“bail jumping” is likely to be considered.234 The question the
Committee sought to resolve was whether it was ethical for an
attorney to reveal the whereabouts of her client after she had missed
her court date.235 After failing to show up for trial, the defendant sent

227. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002).
228. Id.
229. Moore, supra note 222, at 244.
230. See generally id.
231. Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l & Judicial Ethics,
Formal Op. 2002-1 (2002) (an attorney’s duty of confidentiality is “the bedrock of the
adversary system”).
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 405 (1975).
235. Id.
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her lawyer a letter with information regarding her whereabouts, but
instructed the attorney to keep the contents of the letter
confidential.236 As a result, the attorney was left in an ethical bind;
should she reveal the location of her client, or keep the information
confidential and uphold her duty of confidentiality? The Opinion
directed the attorney to follow a three-step procedure:
1. He should notify the defendant that he cannot represent him so
long as he remains a fugitive. He should further urge him to
surrender to the proper authorities.
2. He should not voluntarily seek out the public authorities and
inform them of the address of the defendant.
3. If a police officer, investigator, or prosecutor should approach the
attorney for the address of the defendant, he should refrain from
furnishing this information, which has been vouchsafed to him by
a client who requested that it be kept confidential.237

While the Opinion does not unambiguously state that bail jumping
is a “past crime,” it can be inferred that the Committee did not view
bail jumping as a “continuous crime.” Even though the attorney
became aware that her client had committed bail jumping, the
Opinion explicitly instructed the attorney that she still could not
breach her duty of confidentiality to her client.238
Although doing so less blatantly, the ABA also seems to view bail
jumping as a “past crime.” In 1930, the Ethics Committee vowed that
an attorney is not compelled to reveal the location of a bail skip when
she acquires knowledge of her client’s whereabouts from confidential
communications with relatives of the client.239 By determining that
knowledge of the client’s criminal conduct does not enable the
attorney to ethically breach her duty of confidentiality, the ABA
seemed to be inferring that bail jumping is a “past crime.”240
Furthermore, the ABA withdrew an opinion that required an
attorney to either relinquish communication with her client, or reveal
the client’s location if she refused to surrender herself to
authorities.241
The withdrawn opinion maintained that by
continuously communicating with her client, the attorney was

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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implicitly encouraging her not to return.242 Although withdrawing the
opinion does not entail that the ABA now forbids attorneys from
disclosing confidential information about a client who refuses to
surrender, it underscores the ABA’s reluctance to explicitly allow
attorneys to reveal confidential information about a client after they
know that the client committed bail jumping.
The above opinions present situations that are distinct from the
circumstances at play with clients who receive bail assistance from a
charitable fund, such as the Freedom Fund. While the attorneys
above acquired information related to their client’s location from
either the client herself or from her family members, the charitable
fund may not have any contact with either the client or someone who
knows of her whereabouts. Instead, the Fund might only have the
information they initially acquired from the client’s attorney, which
could include details about where the client spends her free time,
where her family is located, and who to call if she cannot be
contacted. But if attorneys are precluded from voluntarily disclosing
their clients’ whereabouts even when the client reveals her location to
her attorney, then nothing suggests that an attorney can ethically
provide personal information about the client when it is merely
tangentially related to her whereabouts.
To remit a bail forfeiture in the event of a bail skip, the bondsman
must, among other things, “expend money and effort in an effort to
produce the defendant.”243 In an effort to locate the defendant, the
bondsman may be compelled to reveal the defendant’s private
information that received when he was hired.244
Because
communications between a bondsman and their client is not
privileged, a bondsman can freely disclose the confidential
information without any ethical constraints. An attorney, on the
other hand, is likely precluded from doing so. Because information
related to the client’s whereabouts certainly qualifies as confidential
information pursuant to Rule 1.6,245 and none of the exceptions under
1.6(b) seem to apply, an attorney who bails out her client is likely
precluded from revealing confidential information about a client who
committed bail jumping.
Although the attorney’s duty of confidentiality makes it unlikely
that an individual will be able to fully satisfy her obligations as a
242.
243.
244.
245.

Id.
People v. Mfrs. Cas. Ins. Co. 144 N.Y.S.2d 282, 283 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. 1955).

See Page, supra note 198.
N.Y. Cnty. Lawyers’ Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 702 (1995).
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bondsman while abiding by her ethical duties as an attorney, a legal
services organization can implement the charitable fund in a manner
that easily eliminates the possibility of an ethical violation. While the
general rule is that “[A lawyer] may not divulge confidential
communications, information, and secrets imparted to him by the
client or acquired during their professional relations,”246 an attorney is
authorized to reveal her client’s confidential information if the client
gives her “informed consent.”247 If, at the onset of the representation,
attorneys were required to receive their client’s permission to breach
their duty of confidentiality in the event of a bail skip, then legal
services organizations would avoid the ethical dilemma that the duty
of confidentiality poses. The attorney must not merely receive her
client’s consent, but must also make sure that she “has communicated
information adequate[ly] . . . [about] the material risks of the
proposed course of conduct and reasonably available alternatives.”248
In doing so, the attorney must make sure that her client is not simply
consenting because of her inherent vulnerability as a recent arrestee.
If the client freely consents to the disclosure, attorneys and their
agents will be able to uphold their ethical responsibilities pursuant to
Rule 1.6, while simultaneously satisfying their obligations as a bail
bondsman. Without a procedure in place that ensures that the clients
have provided their attorneys with authorization to breach their duty
of confidentiality, legal services organizations may act unethically by
either implementing a charitable bail fund or working with a
charitable group that already has one.

3. Can a Court Compel an Attorney to Reveal Information that
Would Cause the Attorney to Breach Her Duty of Confidentiality to
Her Client
An attorney’s duty to her client is “qualified by [her duty] of
candor to the court” and “the performance of the attorney’s duty to
present her client’s case with persuasive force, while maintaining the

246. ABA Comm. on Prof’l Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 40-202 (1940).
247. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.00 r. 1.6(a)(1) (2013).
“Informed consent” denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated information adequate
for the person to make an informed decision, and after the lawyer has
adequately explained to the person the material risks of the proposed
course of conduct and reasonably available alternatives.
Id. r. 1.0(j).
248. Id. r. 1.0(j).
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confidences of the client, is qualified by the advocate’s duty of candor
to the court.”249 Thus, “Rule 3.3(c) makes crystal clear that the
disclosure duty applies” even when doing so would cause the attorney
to violate her duty of confidentiality under Rule 1.6.250
It is sometimes difficult to determine, however, when the duty of
candor applies to an attorney. Determining precisely when an
attorney must disclose information to the court is important when
deciphering if an individual can ethically act as both an individual’s
attorney and her bondsman. By compelling lawyers to reveal their
client’s confidences when the court demands, the attorney’s ability to
act as a bondsman will not be compromised. But if the attorney can
ignore or delay providing this information to a tribunal, the attorney
might be shunning her responsibilities as a bail bondsman.
Rule 1.6(b)(6) states that a lawyer may reveal her client’s
confidential information “when permitted or required under these
Rules or to comply with other law or court order.”251 New York has
interpreted “required by law” as applying “only to court orders which
are not the subject to further review.”252 Although failing to comply
with a subpoena, for example, can lead to criminal punishment,
attorneys who receive a subpoena or other formal request are
precluded in some jurisdictions from revealing their client’s
confidences or secrets without the client’s consent.253 The Nassau
County Bar Association stated that in the absence of a court order
directing the disclosure, an attorney may not breach her duty of
confidentiality to her client.254
The New York State Bar Association, on the other hand, did not
preclude attorneys from disclosing their clients’ confidences upon a
formal request from the court, but instead provided the attorneys
with the ability to delay doing so.255 The state held that when “the
order is subject to good faith challenge, the lawyer should be free to
postpone giving the court ordered testimony pending appropriate
review.”256 In doing so, the attorney may move to quash the subpoena
and inform the court that her ethical duties dictate that she cannot

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.

Id. r. 3.3 cmt. 2.
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 837 (2010).
COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.00 r. 1.6(b)(6).
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 528 (1981).
Nassau Cnty. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 98-5 (1998).

Id.
N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 528 (1981).

Id.
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voluntarily reveal the requested information.257 If the court rejects
the attorney’s motion, and thereby orders the attorney to disclose the
requested information, the attorney must reveal her client’s
confidences pursuant to Rule 1.6(b)(6).258
Although Rule 1.6(b)(6) does not explicitly state that an attorney
must reveal her client’s confidential information after being ordered
to by the court, Rule 3.4(a)(6) provides that in her representation of a
client, a lawyer shall not “conceal or knowingly fail to disclose that
which [he] is required by law to reveal.”259 The Rule thus provides a
clear responsibility for the attorney to disclose her client’s
confidences after a final order by the court. Much like a bail
bondsman, attorneys working with the Fund and non-legal employees
of the organization are compelled to reveal private information about
the defendant upon court order. If the charitable bail organizations
comply with the court orders, then the court would not be devoid of
information they would normally acquire from a non-attorney, forprofit bondsman.
Unlike an attorney, however, a bondsman who is subpoenaed
cannot invoke a privilege to postpone disclosure of the requested
information. As a result, there is hardly a delay between when the
court requests the information and when the bondsman discloses it.
A court order, though, may require the immediate disclosure of
certain information to properly serve the needs of the criminal justice
system. By delaying the disclosure of their clients’ confidences, the
attorneys could frustrate the urgent needs of law enforcement. This
concern, however, is a criminal justice issue rather than an ethical
one.
C. Is Implementing a Charitable Bail Fund Just a Way For
Legal Services Organizations to Solicit Clients?
Some may argue that by making it well-known that they will post
bail for certain clients, organizations like the Bronx Defenders
improperly solicit clients. This argument, however, holds no weight.
First, non-profit legal services organizations, unlike private law firms,
have no financial incentive to solicit business. Because the attorneys’
salaries are the same regardless of how busy they are, it is not
257. See, e.g., Answering Your Questions About Legal Ethics, VA. ST. BAR ASS’N,
http://www.vsb.org/profguides/FAQ_leos/LegalEthicsFAQs.html (last visited Oct. 21,
2012).
258. See N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 1.6(b)(6) (2013).
259. Id. r. 3.4(a)(6).
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reasonable to view their practice of posting bail for certain clients as a
means of feeding business into the attorney’s practice. More
importantly, the Bronx Defenders’ ability to post bail for their clients
cannot be viewed as an improper attempt to solicit business because
defendants cannot simply choose to acquire their services. Instead, a
defendant must first be arrested in Bronx County and subsequently
be assigned to a public defender.260 To be assigned to a public
defender, the arrestee must first be eligible for one.261 “[E]ligibility
determination[s] must be made on a case-by-case basis, and therefore
must not be premised solely on any single factor.”262 Consequently,
the determination of whether the arrestee can utilize the services of a
public defender rests with the Court, rather than with the defendant
herself. As a result, the practice of providing bail assistance to certain
clients can hardly be construed as an improper attempt to solicit
business if the only clients they work with have no say in whether
they can acquire their services.
Finally, even if a non-profit legal services organization advertises
its ability to act as both a client’s attorney and bondsman, which could
be unethical pursuant to Rule 7.1,263 it would not raise any ethical
questions. Advertisement is defined in Rule 1.0(a) of New York’s
Rules of Professional Conduct as “any public or private
communication made by or on behalf of a lawyer or law firm about
that lawyer or law firm’s services, the primary purpose of which is for
the retention of the lawyer or law firm.”264 Non-profit legal services
organizations, like the Bronx Defenders, however, are not
compensated based on the amount of work they do. Furthermore,
their clients must qualify for their services, as opposed to having the
ability to hire them. It is not plausible, therefore, that the
advertisements would be utilized as a means to acquire clients.
Instead, the advertisements would likely be used as a means to
encourage other charitable groups to team-up with legal services
organizations and fight to abate the vulnerability of indigent
defendants.

260. Holistic Defense, Defined, supra note 21.
261. PUB. DEF. BACKUP CTR., DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR APPOINTED
COUNSEL IN NEW YORK STATE 7–8 (1994), available at http://www.nysda.org/
docs/PDFs/Pre2010/%5B335%5D%20Determining%20Eligibility%20for%20Appoi
nted%20Counsel%20in%20NYS%20(NYSDA).pdf.
262. Id. at 7.
263. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.0 r. 7.1.
264. Id. r. 1.0(a).
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D. Do Attorneys Provide Improper Financial Assistance to
Their Clients or Enter into a Business Transaction with
Them by Agreeing to Work with a Charitable
Organization that Posts Bail on Their Behalf?
In People v. Miranda, the Bronx District Attorney argued that the
Bronx Defenders attorneys improperly provided financial assistance
to their clients by working with an organization that agreed to post
bail on their clients’ behalf.265 Although the New York State Bar has
not directly addressed whether bail is a litigation expense,266 which
would conclusively answer the question of whether the conduct is
indeed unethical under Rule 1.8(e), the circumstances dictate that the
attorneys did not improperly provide financial assistance to their
clients. The purpose of Rule 1.8(e) is both to avoid encouraging a
client to pursue litigation that might not otherwise be brought and to
avoid giving the “lawyer[] too great a financial stake in the
litigation.”267 Viewing the bail assistance as improper financial
assistance ignores what the Rule actually sought to prevent. First, the
beneficiaries of the financial assistance are criminal defendants who
are using the resources from the Fund to avoid pretrial incarceration,
not pursue litigation. Second, by relying on private donations to post
bail for the clients, the Bronx Defenders attorneys did not inherit any
financial stake in the litigation. While it seems clear that attorneys do
not violate 1.8(e) by working with a charitable organization that posts
bail for its clients, another related concern is whether attorneys enter
into a “business transaction” pursuant to Rule 1.8(a) by agreeing to
provide bail assistance to certain clients.
Ethics opinions that address whether an attorney enters a business
transaction when she agrees to serve as her client’s bondsman have
focused on the attorney’s inherent advantage in bargaining power.
The State Bar of Texas, for example, stated that an attorney enters
into an improper business transaction with her client when the
attorney posts bail for her client, but is authorized to plead “no
contest” on behalf of the client if she fails to appear.268 Because the
“added provision is of no benefit to the client but has [instead] been
added by the lawyer solely to protect the financial interest of the

265. People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U), at *16–17
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
266. See, e.g., COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 1200.00.
267. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 10 (2009).
268. Prof’l Ethics Comm. for the State Bar of Tex., Op. 599 (2010).
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lawyer,” the terms of the agreement are not “fair and reasonable” to
the client.”269 Similarly, the Virginia Bar Association held that “loans
made to clients for assistance with living expenses during the course
of litigation constitute the lawyer’s entering into . . . a business
transaction that would allow his professional judgment to be affected
by his own financial interest.”270 But even though this was deemed an
improper business transaction, the attorney could advise his clients
“of the potential conflicts of interest,” and ethically enter into the
agreement “provided that the transaction is not unconscionable,
unfair or inequitable when made.”271 Thus, it is essential to examine
both the conduct of the defense attorneys and their relationship with
their clients when determining if the attorneys entered into an
improper business transaction pursuant to Rule 1.8(a).
Unlike the attorneys in the ethics opinions above, Ms. Towns of the
Bronx Freedom Fund did not enter into a business transaction with
the Bronx Defenders clients. First, the clients who received bail
assistance did not purchase anything from the attorney or her agent;
rather than purchasing a bail bond from an attorney, the clients
simply received bail assistance because their file dictated that they
were not flight risks. Moreover, the prospect of being bailed out by
the Freedom Fund was available to all Bronx Defenders clients so
long as their attorneys referred their file to Ms. Towns for review.272
In that regard, it could be viewed as just a “standard transaction”273
between the Bronx Defenders and its clients. Finally, Ms. Towns did
not capitalize on any inherent advantage in bargaining power over
her client. Not only did Ms. Towns not acquire anything from the
clients, but she did not even communicate with them when deciding
whether to post bail on their behalf.274 Instead, she relied on
information provided to her by the client’s attorney.275
CONCLUSION
Although the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill “takes an important step
toward leveling the playing field for working people and creating a

269. Id.
270. Va. State Bar Ass’n Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1269 (1989).
271. Id.
272. See generally People v. Miranda, No. 012208C2009, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op.
51560(U) (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009).
273. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.8 cmt. 1 (2009).
274. See generally, Miranda, 2009 N.Y. Slip Op. 51560(U).
275. Id.
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more just bail system,”276 the practice that the Bill seeks to promote
will soon be halted if the New York State Bar deems such conduct to
be unethical. Consequently, this Note set out to anticipate and
resolve the potential ethical concerns that will arise once charitable
bail funds, like the Freedom Fund, are implemented. In doing so, it
becomes clear that legal services organizations can satisfy their ethical
duties as attorneys even after teaming-up with charitable groups who
serve as bondsmen for their clients.
First, without either a pecuniary or otherwise personal interest at
stake, the Bronx Defenders attorneys and Ms. Towns did not violate
Rule 1.7(a).277 If legal services organizations, however, are not careful
about how they implement a bail fund, there is a risk that a conflict of
interest will arise. To avoid such conflicts of interest, it is necessary to
make sure that there is no policy in place sanctioning attorneys who
recommend a client who ultimately fails to appear.278 If such a policy
exists, an attorney’s ability to represent her client could be
compromised by the attorney’s desire to avoid monetary sanctions or
other forms of punishment. Furthermore, to make sure that attorneys
are not disproportionately motivated to preserve the resources of the
Fund for future clients, there should be a considerable amount of
money already invested in the Fund before it begins providing bail
assistance to criminal defendants.279
Moreover, the implementation of the Bronx Freedom Fund can
hardly be construed as an attempt by the Bronx Defenders to
improperly solicit clients.280 Similarly, the attorneys will not run afoul
of Rule 1.8(e) by improperly providing financial assistance to a client,
or 1.8(a) by entering into a “business transaction” with the client, so
long as the attorneys and the non-legal staff are neither capitalizing
on any inherent advantage over the clients, nor disproportionately
benefiting from the agreement.281
There are clearly circumstances, however, where the attorney or
her agent must abandon her ethical responsibilities in order to satisfy
the obligations of a bail bondsman.282 Attorneys working with
charitable bail funds, for example, may be unable to uphold their

276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.

Press Release, supra note 31.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.A.
See discussion supra Part III.C.
See discussion supra Part III.D.
See discussion supra Part III.B.
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commitment to protecting their client’s confidentiality while faithfully
fulfilling the responsibilities of a bondsman. This situation leaves the
attorney turned bondsman in an ethical quagmire: should she breach
her duty of confidentiality to her client and voluntarily disclose
information related to her whereabouts, or should her commitment to
her client supersede her responsibilities as a bondsman?
Fortunately, legal services organizations can circumvent the
challenges that the duty of confidentiality poses. If at the onset of the
representation attorneys are required to get their clients’ “informed
consent” to breach the duty of confidentiality in the event of a bail
skip, then they will be able to satisfy their obligations as their clients’
bondsmen while fulfilling their ethical responsibilities as attorneys.283
If implemented correctly, charitable bail funds can help reduce the
pervasiveness of pretrial incarceration for poor and indigent
defendants. Ever since Tocqueville first visited America, the country
has struggled to foster judicial parity for indigent criminal defendants.
While the battle for promoting equity for indigent defendants is
certainly far from over, the Charitable Bail Bonds Bill should serve as
a good first-step in ameliorating their inherent vulnerability.

283. See discussion supra Part III.B.

